Objectual understanding, factivity and belief

Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s (2007) ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills (2009), §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion

Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility

This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-epistemic practice

Googled Assertion

Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not

DIFFERENTIAL GENE EXPRESSION IN EQUINE CARTILAGINOUS TISSUES AND INDUCED CHONDROCYTES

Degenerative joint disease, or osteoarthritis, is a major cause of lameness and morbidity in horses, humans, and dogs. There are no truly satisfactory cures for this widespread problem and current treatments all have limitations or unwanted side effects. New cell-based strategies to repair joint surface lesions have generated a high level of interest, but have yet to achieve the full restoration of articular cartilage structure and function. Currently used therapy cells include autologous chondrocytes and adult mesenchymal cells such as bone marrow derived cells and adipose derived cells. Unfortunately, the resultant repair tissue is biomechanically inferior fibrocartilage. A critical gap in knowledge in this regard is a limited understanding of the specific cellular phenotype of normal, robust articular chondrocytes. This thesis examines the global mRNA transcriptome of equine articular cartilage to test the hypothesis that adult articular chondrocytes have a unique gene expression profile. In the first part of the study, RNA-sequencing was used to compare the mRNA transcriptome of normal adult articular cartilage with five other cartilaginous tissues. From these comparisons, locus level gene expression and alternative splicing patterns have been identified that clearly distinguish articular cartilage. In the second part of the study, fetal (interzone, cartilage anlagen chondrocytes, dermal fibroblasts) and adult (bone marrow derived, adipose derived, articular chondrocytes, dermal fibroblasts) primary cells were grown in culture and stimulated to differentiate into chondrocytes. The chondrogenic differentiation potential as assessed by matrix proteoglycan and the expression of cartilage biomarker genes was highly variable among cell types. Together, these results advance our understanding of the specific phenotype of articular chondrocytes and the potential of prospective therapeutic progenitor cells to differentiate into articular chondrocytes. This new knowledge will improve efforts to optimize cell-based therapies for osteoarthritis and the repair of joint cartilage lesions

Developing a Measure of Information Seeking about Phishing

Phishing e-mails are fraudulent e-mails used to gain access to sensitive information or secure computer systems. They persuade users to click on malicious links, download attachments or provide sensitive information, such as usernames or passwords. One approach that aims to reduce people’s susceptibility to phishing is the provision of information to users regarding the phishing threat and the techniques used within phishing e-mails. In line with this, awareness campaigns are often used within organizations and wider society to raise awareness of phishing and encourage people to engage with protective information. However, the potential effectiveness of such approaches in reducing susceptibility remains uncertain. In particular, there is a lack of research investigating (i) whether the propensity to access such information may in itself influence susceptibility to phishing and (ii) the different factors that motivate people to engage with information in the first place. In order to understand how current and future interventions regarding phishing may be consumed by users, as well as their potential impact on phishing susceptibility, it is important to conduct theoretically based research that provides a foundation to investigate these issues. This study provides a first step in addressing this by developing and validating a theoretically based survey measure across two studies centred upon the constructs of protection motivation theory (perceived vulnerability, severity, self-efficacy and response efficacy) to assess the factors that influence whether people choose to keep up to date with protective information about phishing. This survey measure is then used within Study 2 to provide an initial investigation of the role of these constructs in (i) self-reported user intentions to keep up to date with phishing techniques in the future and (ii) phishing discrimination ability, assessed using a phishing quiz. Overall, higher perceived threat severity, self-efficacy and response efficacy were associated with greater intentions, while greater perceived vulnerability was associated with lower intentions. No relationship was found with phishing discrimination ability. By understanding the factors that influence user intention to maintain knowledge and seek information about phishing threats, it will be possible to ensure that, as effective interventions are developed, their potential impact can be maximized

Norms of assertion: the quantity and quality of epistemic support

We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey (2010) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding, rather than knowledge, constitutes the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. If we are right that understanding (and not just knowledge) is the epistemic norm for a restricted class of assertions, then this straightforwardly undercuts not only the widely supposed quantitative view, but also a more general presupposition concerning the universalisability of some norm governing assertion—the presumption (almost entirely unchallenged since Williamson’s 1996 paper) that any epistemic norm that governs some assertions should govern assertions—as a class of speech act—uniformly

On Pritchard, Objectual Understanding and the Value Problem

Duncan Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2010, forthcoming) has argued for an elegant solution to what have been called the value problems for knowledge at the forefront of recent literature on epistemic value. As Pritchard sees it, these problems dissolve once it is recognized that that it is understanding-why, not knowledge, that bears the distinctive epistemic value often (mistakenly) attributed to knowledge. A key element of Pritchard’s revisionist argument is the claim that understanding-why always involves what he calls strong cognitive achievement—viz., cognitive achievement that consists always in either (i) the overcoming of a significant obstacle or (ii) the exercise of a significant level of cognitive ability. After outlining Pritchard’s argument, we show (contra Pritchard) that understanding-why does not essentially involve strong cognitive achievement. Interestingly, in the cases in which understanding-why is distinctively valuable, it is (we argue) only because there is sufficiently rich objectual understanding in the background. If that’s right, then a plausible revisionist solution to the value problems must be sensitive to different kinds of understanding and what makes them valuable, respectively

Understanding a communicated thought

The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that the understanding one has of a proposition or a propositional content of a representational vehicle is a species of what contemporary epistemologists characterise as objectual understanding. Second, we demonstrate that even though this type of understanding differs from linguistic understanding, in many instances of successful communication, these two types of understanding jointly contribute to understanding a communicated thought